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Two Photographs and Their Stories of New Mexico’s
Statehood
David V. Holtby

E

arly in the afternoon of Saturday, 6 January 1912, thirteen guests from
New Mexico joined Pres. William Howard Taft in his private office. The
twelve men and one woman, along with four cabinet secretaries, braved the
chilly thirteen degree temperature and arrived at the White House under an
overcast sky. Inside the White House, everyone undoubtedly warmed up when
the president signed the proclamation approving New Mexico’s entry into the
Union. Taft spoke but two sentences: “Well, it is all over, I am glad to give you
life,” and pausing to smile, he added, “I hope you will be healthy.” Taft was
the last of fifteen presidents to preside over New Mexico as a U.S. territory,
and his eighteen words both acknowledged the government’s patrimony and
ended six decades of hard political labor aimed at attaining self-rule. Several
photographers captured the occasion, and soon the picture would hang in
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New Mexico’s twenty-six county courthouses. The guests went outside and
posed for another photograph on the White House steps.1
President Taft likely spoke off the cuff. The allusions to a birth and a new
creation may have been the obvious metaphors for the event, but today his
words seem unduly paternalistic. What went unsaid is noteworthy. He ignored
New Mexico’s three-hundred-year history under three different national flags
in addition to its three millennia of continuous indigenous occupation. With
five words—“Well, it is all over”—Taft brushed aside six decades of delays
and disappointments that stemmed largely from inaction or obstruction in
Washington, D.C. Also, his words summarily dismissed decades of carping
and misrepresentations by opponents of statehood—as if these, too, had
never occurred or were insignificant. In a ceremony that lasted less than five
minutes, perhaps the most important omission is that Taft made no reference
to his decisive role in securing statehood for both New Mexico and Arizona,
the latter entering the Union on 14 February. Following his election on 3
November 1908, Taft began a political battle for New Mexico statehood. The
decisive moment arrived a year after his election when he told Sen. Albert J.
Beveridge, chair of the Senate Committee on Territories, to end his eight-year
obstruction of New Mexico and Arizona statehood. Taft expected him to be
a good “Administration Republican” and to fall in line with the support of
statehood. Senator Beveridge and Congress passed the necessary enabling
bill, which the president signed on 20 June 1910. Then, on 6 January 1912 at
1:35 PM, New Mexico drew its first breath as a state.2
The two photographs recording the arrival of New Mexico statehood are
documents no less important to “read” than the proclamation signed that
wintry afternoon (see ill. 1 and ill. 2). Each one offers a separate narrative.
Presidential or executive power is the dominant theme of the ceremony in
Taft’s office, and the point is reinforced in the composition of the photograph.
The image positions the witnesses in the shadows and on the periphery. But
a definite shift in political authority had occurred. By signing the proclamation, Taft both ceded unchecked federal authority and ushered in an era of
popularly elected state officials. On the White House steps, a new hierarchy
of power determined the alignment of those present at the signing: state officials in the first row, citizens behind them, and senior federal officials in
the last row, with their respective tiers corresponding to new responsibilities
in a three-way partnership.
The photographs are celebratory and self-congratulatory and they deliberately exclude two key people: former president Theodore Roosevelt
and Senator Beveridge (ill. 3 and ill. 4). Both politicians will always loom
large in any account of how New Mexico became a state. Also missing are
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ill. 1. president william h. taft signing the proclamation of new
mexico’s statehood on 6 january 1912
(Photograph courtesy Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Digital
Collection, image no. hec2009007180) Also reproduced in Ralph Emerson
Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History, 5 vols. (1911–1917, repr.;
Albuquerque, N.Mex.: Horn and Wallace, 1963) 2:596.

ill. 2. photograph of new mexicans on the steps of the white house
immediately after the statehood ceremony in president taft’s private
office
(Photograph courtesy William A. Keleher Collection, [PICT 000-742-0256],
Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico)
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ill. 3. president
theodore roosevelt,
an official portrait
in early January 1908
when he had fourteen
months remaining in
office
(Photograph courtesy
Library of Congress,
Prints and Photographs
Digital Collection,
image no. 2009633122)

ill. 4. senator albert j. beveridge,
republican of indiana, early in
his tenure as chair of the senate
committee on territories from
december 1901 to march 1911
(Photograph courtesy Library of Congress,
Prints and Photographs Digital Collection,
image no. ggb2006005978)

representatives of four groups tallied in the census of 1910: Nuevomexicanos
(155,155); Native Americans (20,575); African Americans (1,628); and Asians
(504). The European American population was 149,439, or 45.6 percent of
the territory’s 327,301 residents. The photographs also present a greater gender
imbalance than existed in the New Mexico Territory: in 1910, 114,295 men
and 92,257 women comprised the population aged fifteen and older, or 12.5
men to every 10 women. Finally, the photographs contain no children, but
youngsters under the age of fifteen constituted 37 percent of the total population in 1910, a proportion consistent across the West, where they “made up
a substantial part, in some places a majority, of western settlers.”3
While the photographs skew the narrative toward the European American experience, two questions restore a balanced perspective: What was the
significance of statehood to New Mexico and its citizens, and how does the
past inform the understanding of developments now and in the future? At
the outset, we can give one brief answer to each question. First and foremost,
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entering the Union conferred political independence—an end to federal
control and the beginning of home rule. Statehood, according to the Las
Vegas (N.Mex.) La Voz del Pueblo newspaper, meant “No longer will [we]
be governed from afar like a foreign colony.” For New Mexicans, statehood
completed a political decolonization in which the people’s liberation came
in being full citizens and not occupied subjects. As New Mexicans rejoiced,
Felipe Maximiliano Chacón, poet and journalist, penned “To New Mexico,
On Being Admitted as a State.” Acknowledging the struggle endured by those
“who have suffered / With you numerous disappointments” and “The unjust
insults of many years,” he proclaimed, “A glorious and shining star” had been
placed “Forever on the American Flag.” He urged the people to “See that
honor writes your story,” and he greeted the new era with “An enthusiastic
chorus of hurrahs,” and the cry, “Long live New Mexico, the State.”4
The sixteen individuals gathered on the White House steps appear subdued as they shed the old order of territorial status for the bright future of
home rule and popular sovereignty. This transition of power defined new
political responsibilities, and a century later issues of governance in New
Mexico that had roiled the territory still recur in the twenty-first century:
stewarding economic development and natural resource use; instituting
wise environmental practices; ensuring cultural continuity amid great shifts
in technology and market forces; and creating political processes that curb
corruption and promote government of, for, and by the people.
Statehood’s Political Stories
Growth and experimentation preceded 6 January 1912, all the while inspiring
people—both present and absent in the photographs—to work toward adding
New Mexico’s star to the U.S. flag as the forty-seventh state. When finally
achieved, statehood heralded a new political era in both New Mexico and
the nation’s capital. In these two images, the White House is far more than
a backdrop. It is, in fact, a quintessential symbol of federal power, and it has
a commanding presence in both photographs. During the height of the Progressive Era, the final push for statehood coincided with an unprecedented
expansion of government programs that remade the landscape of New
Mexico after 1900. Millions of acres were set aside as federal forest reserves,
and the federal government initiated irrigation and reclamation projects
that brought both water and tens of thousands of new settlers—mostly
homesteaders—between 1900 and 1910. Moreover, the government’s dam
building also pumped more than fifteen million dollars into New Mexico
in a dozen or so years. That infusion of federal money prepared people to
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seek even more government projects that would enhance both their quality
of life and their economic fortunes.5
The photographs also suggest a political separation between Arizona and
New Mexico that Congress had never acknowledged. For decades Congress
had linked the territories of New Mexico and Arizona whenever statehood was
addressed, and the enabling bill of 20 June 1910 still yoked the two territories
together. Congress crafted a single political process for state formation and
applied it to both territories. Once Taft signed the enabling bill, Democraticcontrolled Arizona and Republican-dominated New Mexico wrote, approved,
and forwarded their respective constitutions to Congress and the president.
But almost immediately it was clear that the two territories would not complete the required steps in a similar fashion or on the same schedule. Stark
partisan differences emerged in and portended major complications for the
two territories, especially on the issue of granting direct citizen influence
in the state’s political life. The most divisive issues concerned voter-created
checks on government through initiative, referendum, and the recall of
elected officials, particularly judges. All three stood at the heart of political
reform in the Progressive Era.
President Taft opposed these measures, especially recalls. Shortly before
the New Mexico constitutional convention in early October 1910, Taft dispatched his most trusted political advisor, Pmstr. Gen. Frank H. Hitchcock,
to meet with key delegates in Albuquerque. Hitchcock had been traveling to
New Mexico on Republican Party business since 1907, and on the president’s
behalf, he explained Taft’s objections to the three issues and “its probable
effect with reference to [the constitution’s] rejection or otherwise by the
President.” As a result, only a watered-down referendum process was included
in New Mexico’s constitution, but Arizona embraced all three Progressive
reforms: the initiative, referendum, and recall. Voter approval followed on 21
January 1911 in New Mexico and 9 February in Arizona. Only in New Mexico,
though, did rancor erupt over allegations of fraudulent voting. Congress
later investigated the charges and dismissed them. But when the congressional bill accepting the two constitutions finally reached the White House
on 15 August, Taft vetoed it. In the following two days, intense negotiations
produced an agreement between the president and congressional leaders to
put statehood back on track. Arizona voters had to rescind the recall clause,
and New Mexicans had to vote on—but were not required to accept—a less
restrictive process to amend their constitution. Following House and Senate
approval of this agreement, Taft signed the legislation into law on the Monday
afternoon of 21 August. On 7 November, Arizona and New Mexico voters
approved the respective modifications to their constitutions. But Arizona
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proved incorrigible on the issue of recall. In November 1912, Arizona voters
amended their constitution to reinstate it.6
Political brinksmanship over statehood did not end with New Mexico
acceding to the president and the August dictate by Congress. A telegram
arrived in Santa Fe from Washington D.C. on Thursday night, 4 January
1912, and delivered dismaying news: statehood could not go forward. Shortly
afterward the White House canceled the 10:00 AM ceremony set for Friday.
The headline in the Albuquerque (N.Mex.) Morning Journal on Saturday, 6
January, read: “STATEHOOD ONCE MORE HELD UP / LITIGATION THIS TIME.” The
Department of Justice had intervened in an attempt “to recover lands in New
Mexico alleged to have been acquired wrongfully by the Alamogordo Lumber
Company.” The dispute involved land and timber rights in Otero County
sold by New Mexico Territory in 1901. Six years later, the Justice Department
began filing lawsuits to challenge timber and land sales in Otero County and
elsewhere in the territory, which had been negotiated between 1901 and 1906.
The litigation continued until the eve of New Mexico statehood when the
Justice Department thwarted the event. In response to a recent ruling by a
territorial district court that remanded the Alamogordo Lumber Company
case to New Mexico’s state judicial system, the Justice Department sought to
protect its jurisdiction and pursue the lawsuit in federal court. Federal lawyers
persuaded President Taft, an expert on constitutional law and a future chief
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, to withhold his proclamation of statehood until New Mexico Territory provided written assurance that this case
would continue in federal court. The telegram announcing the government’s
demand poured ice water onto celebrants toasting New Mexico’s final hours
as a territory and reminded them of all that was objectionable about territorial
status: they were under the thumb of the federal government. Acting quickly,
Territorial governor William J. Mills obediently yielded to the ultimatum and
forwarded the required papers to the Department of Justice, and after a day’s
delay, the rescheduled signing ceremony took place.7
The photograph shot inside the White House contrasts markedly with the
second one taken on the White House steps following the signing ceremony.
The interior image shows the president sitting at his desk with the proclamation and a duplicate spread before him, but the faces of almost all of the
witnesses are not discernable. Outside on the steps, all sixteen attendees are
visible, and their outerwear conveys the brisk Washington weather. Thirteen
of the sixteen individuals have been identified and the names of two others
can be inferred. New Mexico legislators stood on the first row: from the
left, Harvey B. Fergusson, Democratic congressman; William H. Andrews,
Republican territorial delegate; George Curry, Republican congressman;
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and John Baron Burg, Democratic state legislator and Albuquerque attorney. From the left in the second row are Amasa B. McGaffey, prominent in
western New Mexico’s lumber industry; Edith (Talbot) Barnes, daughter of
a politically prominent Phoenix businessman and wife of Will C. Barnes;
Mabel (Fox) McGaffey, daughter of an Albuquerque jeweler and wife of A.
B. McGaffey; Will C. Barnes, head of the Forest Service grazing division;
John Roberts, aide to George Curry; Charles Curry, Curry’s son; and Ira M.
Bond, Washington correspondent for various New Mexico newspapers. In
the top row on the far left is James G. Darden, a lobbyist representing New
Mexico businesses. The next two men are most likely Sect. of Interior Walter
L. Fisher and Postmaster General Hitchcock followed by Arthur C. Ringland,
the district [regional] forester for New Mexico and Arizona. An unidentified
man stands at the end.8
Three individuals not present at the signing ceremony played decisive roles
in the statehood struggles of New Mexico and Arizona during the preceding
decade. The first was Republican senator Beveridge of Indiana, who used
his position as chair of the Senate Committee on Territories between 1901
and 1911 to delay statehood for partisan political reasons. In his campaign of
obstruction, Beveridge did the bidding
of the most powerful man in the Senate, Republican Nelson W. Aldrich
of Rhode Island, who is the second
figure notably missing in the photographs (ill. 5). Distinguished political
historian Lewis L. Gould explained
that, beginning in 1901, “an attempt to
obtain the admission of the territories
of Arizona and New Mexico ran into
the determined opposition of Senator
Aldrich and the Republican leadership.” Elected to his fourth Senate
term by his state’s legislature in 1898,
Aldrich controlled all committee assignments; that power also permitted
ill. 5. senator nelson w. aldrich,
him to act as the gatekeeper of legislarepublican of rhode island, in his
tion introduced to the Senate chamber
fifth and final term (1905–1911)
and to determine which bills reached
(Photograph courtesy Library of
the Senate floor for final deliberation.
Congress, Prints and Photographs
His loss of power under Democratic
Digital Collection, image no.
president Grover Cleveland’s second
hec2009003326)
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administration (1893–1897) had remained a bitter memory. The six new
states admitted to the Union in 1889 and 1890 had voted overwhelmingly
for Cleveland. Aldrich’s biographer, Nathaniel Wright Stephenson, notes,
“He had burnt his fingers once admitting States that proved a danger to his
party, and he did not propose to do it again.” Accordingly, Aldrich appointed
the ambitious Beveridge to chair the Senate Committee on Territories in
December 1901 with the understanding that he was to stall all efforts to grant
New Mexico, Arizona, and Oklahoma statehood. Beveridge jealously guarded
the power and prerogatives of Aldrich and like-minded senators from the
Midwest and New England until 1907 when Oklahoma entered the Union.
Thereafter, he blocked the arrival of new senators from New Mexico and
Arizona until both he and Aldrich had exited Congress.9
Neither Aldrich nor Beveridge ever publically acknowledged their political motives, although newspapers openly discussed them. Instead, the two
senators dredged up accusations, such as “lack of fitness,” to justify denying
statehood to southwestern territories, especially New Mexico. Beveridge railed
endlessly about how Nuevomexicanos retained their Spanish language and
Hispanic culture and had not assimilated into Anglo American society. In
1903 he declared that New Mexico’s “enormous ‘Mexican’ preponderance
in population, whose solidity [after] fifty years of American influence has
not changed[,] is the chief reason against the admission of that territory.”
Beveridge repeatedly rationalized his actions to himself and others:
I did not show any disposition to please and conciliate; [upon my
saying] that you rather gently chided me for it; that I turned to you and
said that you did not understand me; that I did not care a snap of my
fingers whether I stayed in public life or not unless I could do things
for the people; that it wasn’t material whether the people appreciate
enough what I did for them or even knew of it—the chief thing was the
doing of the work. . . . [W]hether I drop dead tomorrow or thirty years
from now, I want to know in my heart and to have the record show that
I have been of some use to the cause of righteousness and justice.10
This self-appointed guardian of “righteousness and justice” had significant
domestic legislative accomplishments—in food safety, child labor, and
conservation—but he maligned Nuevomexicanos solely to serve political
expediency. Such tactics led one historian of his home state to observe the
following: “[Beveridge] believed almost nothing very deeply, and nearly
everything he did believe deeply was false or base.” In fact Beveridge’s shallowness was unremarkable among Senate Republican leaders between 1900
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and 1910. Yet even the Republican leaders of the Senate faced declining
support among their public constituents. Historian Samuel Eliot Morison
later observed, “Their orations, once listened to by enraptured audiences,
now seem but sounding brass and tinkling cymbal.”11
Former president Theodore Roosevelt is the third figure absent from the
photographs. In the months leading up to the election of 1908, Roosevelt
wrote thirteen private letters to Taft, his hand-picked successor. In these
communications, he offered candid—and cordial—advice on how to win
the election and succeed as president. Roosevelt’s implicit assumption was
that Taft would continue all his policies and, in effect, act as his political
proxy. Within fifteen months after Taft’s inauguration, however, a public rift,
evident in their differences over wilderness conservation, opened between
them. In fact Taft had not sought a fight with Roosevelt and actually applied much of what he suggested—even recognizing the importance of the
West in the upcoming election—in the letters from 1908. While statehood
for New Mexico and Arizona never received explicit mention in their correspondence, Roosevelt urged Taft to attend to the western states as a check
on a drift toward Democratic voting. In the presidential election of 1908, the
newest state, Oklahoma, went to Democrat William Jennings Bryan. Taft
understood the importance of holding onto Republican-oriented states in
the West from Roosevelt’s letters and his own experience. In the election of
1912, New Mexico represented such a prospect while Arizona leaned toward
the Democratic Party.12
The election results of 1912 sorely disappointed Taft. Creating the Bull
Moose Party, Roosevelt ran for president against him. New Mexico and
Arizona voted overwhelmingly for the Democratic presidential candidate,
Woodrow Wilson. New Mexico’s popular vote divided as follows: Wilson, 41.4
percent; Taft, 35.9 percent; Roosevelt, 16.1 percent; and the Socialist Eugene
Debs, 5.8 percent. Despite losing in New Mexico, Taft actually fared better
among its voters than among voters nationwide, where Taft received just 23
percent to Roosevelt’s 27 percent. During the election of 1912, Beveridge,
the enfant terrible of statehood, reprised his spoiler’s role and served as a key
advisor to Roosevelt.
A cruel irony exists when contrasting actions taken by Roosevelt and Taft
in pursuit of statehood. Taft provided decisive leadership and imposed his
will on a recalcitrant Congress, especially the Senate. He secured statehood
whereas Roosevelt failed. Taft succeeded because he exerted the very executive leadership that Roosevelt talked about so much but never brought to
bear on New Mexico statehood. Yet today historians remember Roosevelt’s
critique of Taft’s presidency—that his successor was ineffective and weak—a
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theme hammered home in speeches during the presidential election of 1912
when Roosevelt’s Bull Moose Party drained votes away from Taft’s re-election
bid and consigned him to a one-term presidency.13
Today, Taft receives no lasting credit for his political adroitness in securing statehood for New Mexico and Arizona, and Roosevelt is forgiven for
his inability to deliver on his promises and for pushing joint New Mexico
and Arizona statehood for nearly five years. The different approaches taken
by these two presidents mirrored a divided mind in the Republican Party.
Prior to 1912, the Republican Party endorsed statehood for New Mexico and
Arizona territories in 1896, 1900, and 1908. In 1904, amid much turmoil over
uniting Arizona and New Mexico as one state, they dropped all mention of
expanding the Union. Yet with three Republican presidents occupying the
White House beginning in 1897—William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt,
and William Howard Taft—and with commanding majorities in both the
House and Senate up to March 1911, one question is inescapable: why did
Republicans take so long to deliver on their promise of statehood? A large
part of the response lies in Senator Beveridge’s obstructionist tactics, but that
is an incomplete and unsatisfactory answer.
Exercising Presidential Power
The nature of Taft’s and Roosevelt’s presidential leadership must be understood by first considering the differences between how they used advisors.
Roosevelt addressed himself to this matter immediately after winning reelection in November 1904. He wrote letters to two close friends—George
H. Putnam, his publisher, and Owen Wister, novelist and author of the
recently published The Virginian—chiding them for questioning why he
deferred to certain powerful Republican senators who were not aligned with
his administration’s policies. In brusque and defensive language, Roosevelt
lectured Putnam about the necessity of respecting the power and authority
of all U.S. senators, including recently deceased Pennsylvania Republican,
political boss, and ardent statehood advocate Sen. Matthew S. Quay:
I have dealt with Quay and with all similar men, not because I regard
them as making me President, not because I had anything selfish to
expect from them, but because, not being a fool, and having certain
policies for the welfare of the Republic at heart, I realized I could
succeed in these policies only by working with the men of prominence
in the Republican party. The Senators, under the first article of the
Constitution, are the official advisors whom I must consult.14
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Roosevelt deferred to the Senate and even allowed Republican senators
to oppose him on statehood year after year. From the outset of Roosevelt’s
presidency in 1901, the Senate’s internal divisions over statehood trumped
the president’s desire to enlarge the Union. In contrast President Taft cajoled
and coerced the Senate to follow his lead on statehood. He never publicly
diminished the Senate’s important role, but he also applied pressure on its
members. Throughout 1909 and 1910, he repeatedly pledged in public to
honor his party’s statehood plank, and in private he leaned hard on Senator
Beveridge and others to follow his lead. He spent the late summer and early
fall of 1909 cajoling Beveridge as well as wooing New Mexicans. In a day-long
train trip with five stops in the New Mexico Territory in mid-October, he
made his strongest public pledge to date. One trumpeted in an Albuquerque
(N.Mex.) Morning Journal headline: “PRESIDENT WINS HEARTS OF ALL NEW
MEXICANS / MOST POWERFUL MAN IN NATION STANDS AS CHAMPION OF STATEHOOD.” During his visit, Taft also pointedly dismissed those politicians and
pundits who carped about New Mexico Territory’s lack of “fitness.” Drawing
on his own experience as governor of the Philippines nearly a decade earlier,
he mentioned his own facility in what he deemed a “beautiful language” and
then at some length praised the “Spanish descended people” for their “hospitality and kindness, generosity and courtesy.” He found Nuevomexicanos
a high-minded group, “loyal to the flag and able to serve their country when
it is necessary.” He also outlined his plans to make statehood a legislative
priority in the upcoming Sixty-First Congress. But not everyone in New
Mexico embraced Taft, and trenchant doubt about his ability to deliver on
his pledge was published in the Democratic-leaning Las Vegas (N.Mex.) La
Voz del Pueblo.15
Taft acted as legislator-in-chief when he sparred with Congress over a bill
enabling statehood. In this effort, his indispensable whip became Postmaster General Hitchcock, who is unquestionably the all-but-forgotten pivotal
figure in steering statehood through Congress in the years 1909 through
1911. Entirely consistent with his quiet role is that he is unidentifiable in the
official photograph of President Taft’s signing the proclamation. Just as the
dim lighting conspired against a clear photograph, shadows likewise shroud
much of Hitchcock’s political work, particularly at crucial moments in the
process. But he had the ear and the confidence of President Taft. Hitchcock
also allied with Delegate Andrews, who helped write the enabling bill and
enlisted his own powerful allies for its support. Principal among them was
his close friend, Pennsylvania senator Boies Penrose. After Senator Aldrich’s
departure in March of 1911, Penrose became the new Republican power in
Congress. In addition to Hitchcock impressive credentials as Taft’s liaison
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to Congress, he had earned the loyalty of the president and congressional
Republicans while chairing the Republican National Committee during
Taft’s successful campaign in 1908. Today, if Hitchcock is remembered,
it is because he was the first postmaster general to recognize the potential
of airplanes to move mail faster. He also secured a spot in history when he
became the first government official to pledge publicly to the children of
America that all their letters to Santa Claus would be delivered.
But how had he worked to promote New Mexico’s statehood? An answer
emerges from the results of a meeting President Taft and Hitchcock had
with Senator Beveridge at the White House on Saturday, 29 January 1910, to
discuss statehood. Taft and Hitchcock agreed to allow Beveridge a free hand
in revising the enabling bill the House passed in January, and the following
Tuesday the White House announced an agreement with leaders of the Senate and House over five of the president’s legislative priorities for the next
five months. Statehood for New Mexico and Arizona headed the list of bills
to be shepherded through Congress by the end of June. Swift action began
barely two weeks later when Beveridge opened his committee’s hearings, and
in the second week of March, the Senate Committee on Territories approved
the enabling bill and forwarded it to the full Senate. Beveridge soon told
friends in Arizona: “The bill will surely pass this session. The kickers cannot
stop it. The opposition is small and dissolving. Arizona and New Mexico will
become states.”16
Why had Beveridge changed his mind on the statehood issue? Hitchcock,
as President Taft’s negotiator, played a decisive role in swaying the senator
in many private discussions. But the true measure of Hitchcock’s political
savvy was evident in his ability to keep Beveridge on track, even after the
American public discovered in late March 1910 that, for several weeks, Taft
had been actively conspiring to oust Beveridge at the April convention of
Indiana Republicans. Taft had carefully timed his effort to ensure that Beveridge’s committee approved the enabling bill on 10 March before he started
to undermine the senator in his home state. In early April, after Beveridge
and allies saw clearly that he would be his party’s Senate candidate, he openly
split with the president in a major speech criticizing Taft’s economic policies,
particularly his high tariffs.17
Hitchcock stood in the middle of this very public political feud, with the
fate of New Mexico statehood hanging in the balance. He still had to guide
the enabling bill through the full Senate, where it went into a queue of more
than nine thousand bills. Hitchcock’s task grew much more complicated in
late March, in part due to the rift between the president and Beveridge but
also because President Taft, changing his legislative priorities, placed a railway
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bill ahead of statehood as his first goal. Over the next two and half months
the Mann-Elkins Act, which reduced and regulated rates charged by the railroads, occasioned much jostling between Democrats and Republicans, and
also triggered clashes within the president’s own party over his approach to
economic issues. Beveridge and other Republicans loyal to former president
Roosevelt refused to vote for a railway bill, thus forcing Hitchcock and the
president to turn to the Democrats for support. In this political wrangling,
statehood became the crucial bargaining chip used by Hitchcock to cobble
together a “deal” that would pass the Mann-Elkins Act. In exchange for their
support, Democrats received assurances that statehood would also come to
a final vote, pursuing a long-time Democratic legislative priority to add new
states in the belief they would send Democrats to the Congress. The MannElkins Act cleared the Senate in early June, and as work began to reconcile the
House and Senate versions the statehood bill moved forward. Taft and other
supporters quickly realized that Beveridge had to be on board for it to pass. As
a result, Taft ceased ostracizing Beveridge, and brought him and Hitchcock
to the White House for a private discussion in mid-June. In a late-evening
session of Congress on Saturday, 18 June, both the Mann-Elkins Act and the
statehood enabling bill cleared each chamber. President Taft immediately
signed the Mann-Elkins Act at 10:15 PM, but waited until Monday, 20 June
1910, to sign the enabling legislation.18
The extent to which Hitchcock navigated the final passage of the enabling
bill in such roiled waters is hinted at in a letter Beveridge wrote on the day
the president signed the bill: “The people of the two new states ought to know
how much Frank Hitchcock did to secure the passage of this bill. During
the present session no man has been so powerful and effective a friend of
statehood as Mr. Hitchcock.” The senator also noted that “his name has, of
course, not gotten into the public prints.” Hitchcock left public service after
Taft’s defeat in 1912, and he had a long and highly successful career as a corporate attorney in New York City. As time passed, he remained interested in
New Mexico and reportedly “owned the controlling interest” in a newspaper,
the Las Vegas (N.Mex.) Optic, in 1929. Following the November election of
1912, Indiana’s Democratic-controlled legislature replaced Beveridge with
John W. Kern, a Progressive reformer and key ally of the incoming president,
Woodrow Wilson.19
When Taft stepped into the presidency, the Democratic Party was on the
rise. In the elections of 1908, it sent 171 members to the House and 32 to the
Senate. Two years later, Democrats captured the House with 230 seats and
made a strong showing in the Senate with 43 members. As Taft began his
third year in office on 4 March 1911, the political landscape had changed. For
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the first time, ten states— five of which were located west of the Mississippi
River—sent a Republican and a Democratic senator. This split occurred
when states enacted reforms that would later coalesce into federal law as the
Seventeenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. These reforms mandated
the popular election of U.S. senators after 31 May 1913. The Democratic Party’s
ascendancy culminated in taking over the White House and both chambers
of the Congress in the November elections of 1912. But in 1909 and 1910, Taft
read correctly that the parties’ shifting numbers and the resulting political
realignment meant that he needed to work with Democrats. Statehood and
the Mann-Elkins Act were the first fruits of that collaboration. Each side
traded support for a key piece of legislation, and Taft’s quid pro quo brought
a political change that had long eluded New Mexicans.20
Taft was one of three presidents between 1901 and 1920 who augmented
their political power. This shift began with Roosevelt’s conservation policies
and the subsequent expansion of executive departments to advance that
agenda. The process continued under Taft and is evident in his maneuvering
to secure passage of the enabling act. It is particularly visible in his presidential
veto of August 1911, when he forced Congress and the territories to accept his
terms for the admission of new states. Yet neither Roosevelt nor Taft increased
presidential power as much as Democratic president Woodrow Wilson did
during and after World War I. In many respects, the Senate’s rejection of the
Treaty of Versailles—passionately advocated by Wilson—in 1919 and the nation’s election of Warren G. Harding in 1920 began a thirteen-year roll-back
of presidential power.
Viewed in this context, New Mexico’s entry into the Union was at about
the midpoint in the rise of presidential power during the early twentieth
century. Yet a wide gulf separated Roosevelt and Taft in their exercise of
presidential authority, and these differences had implications for their approaches to statehood. Roosevelt acted independently when no law could
be found to restrain him, invoking executive orders to create national forests
and national monuments. He also had a tendency to play fast and loose with
public lands by arguing that “the ends justify the means.” Taft, a constitutional
lawyer, would have none of it. Generally speaking, he insisted on working
with Congress on conservation policies and public land issues. These differing styles of governance—namely legal and constitutional requirements
versus free-wheeling administrative mandates—led to a public and heated
dispute between Sect. of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger, a Taft appointee,
and Gifford Pinchot, chief of the U.S. Forest Service and a Roosevelt-era
holdover. The controversy led to Taft’s dismissal of Pinchot in 1910, an act
that contributed to a rupture of the Republican Party in 1912.21
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Does Roosevelt’s decision to mount a third-party challenge through
his Bull Moose candidacy in 1912 have any connection to Taft’s success in
securing New Mexico and Arizona statehood? The short answer is “yes.”
From the time Roosevelt returned from his fifteen-month trip to Europe and
Africa, disembarking in New York on the day Congress approved statehood
(18 June 1910), he began finding fault with Taft’s actions. Slowly, he moved
from private expressions of disappointment, to public criticism, and then to
an outright break in late March 1912. The antecedents of the rift were fully
evident in a letter Roosevelt wrote to a long-time friend in late August 1911. “I
have been much disappointed in Taft,” he declared. “But like many another
man, though a most admirable lieutenant, he is not particularly wise or efficient as a leader. As was probably inevitable, he . . . [became] very anxious
to emphasize the contrast between our administrations by sundering himself
from my especial friends and followers, and appearing therefore as the great,
wise conservative.”22
Roosevelt packed into those sentences three grievances that intersect with
statehood: the first two stem from Taft’s political tactics and legal principles,
while the third simply suggests a bruised ego. Almost immediately upon
taking office, Taft “sundered himself from my especial friends,” Roosevelt
complained, most particularly, from one of Roosevelt’s oldest and most-trusted
political allies, Senator Beveridge. The charge that Taft sought to “appear
as the great, wise conservative” was a two-fold criticism. Roosevelt recoiled
over what he regarded as Taft’s coziness with “such national Republican
leaders as Nelson Aldrich and Boies Penrose,” who were beholden to eastern
“railroads and industrialists.” These two senators and their mutual friend
Delegate Andrews had played important roles in the final push to secure
statehood in 1910; perhaps no action was more decisive for statehood than
Aldrich’s about-face to throw his support behind Taft. Moreover, Taft’s hostility
toward the referendum, initiative, and recall flew in the face of Roosevelt’s
well-known support for these Progressive-backed expressions of popular sovereignty. Finally, the charge that Taft was “not particularly wise or efficient
as a leader” shows more than a hint of sour grapes. A good friend who spent
an evening with Roosevelt in the early spring of 1912 noted his “egotism,
faith in his own doctrines, fondness for power and present hostility to Taft.”
The contrast between Taft’s success in attaining statehood and Roosevelt’s
failure to do so heightened the latter’s desire to complete unfinished business
as president. When his dinner companion asked him why he wanted a third
term, Roosevelt replied, “It is complex. I like power; but I care nothing to
be President as President. I am interested in these ideas of mine and I want
to carry them through.”23
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Roosevelt, as one distinguished historian noted, tended toward “a selfcenteredness” that blinded him from looking closely at people and events.
As a consequence, he misread the country’s support for him in the election
campaign of 1912, and was oblivious to what tactics worked in getting legislation through Congress. Roosevelt wanted another chance to push his
legislative agenda, but he had not adapted his approach. For example, with
final approval of statehood awaiting Senate action in late May 1911, Roosevelt
wrote his long-time friend Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge to urge him to “take a
special interest” in the matter and to expect a visit from former territorial
governor George Curry seeking his support. But such entreaties would have
no more influence in 1911 than had any of the pressure Roosevelt applied to
Beveridge during his presidency. The times required the hardball interparty
maneuvering that Taft used.24
New Mexicans Enter the Congress
A few influential New Mexicans took note of Hitchcock’s prominent role
in securing statehood. Among them was Albert B. Fall, a lawyer, territorial
legislator from Otero County, and recent convert to the Republican Party.
He viewed with considerable suspicion the growing influence Hitchcock
exerted and his friendship with Delegate Andrews. In a correspondence with
novelist and former New Mexico cowboy Eugene Manlove Rhodes just after
Taft’s meeting with Hitchcock and Beveridge at the end of January 1910, Fall
wrote: “I stated clearly that New Mexico would not be admitted until Mr.
Hitchcock was convinced that he had control of the political situation; that I
was correct in this statement I think events as reported by the associated press
have conclusively established.” Thirteen months later, Rhodes informed Fall
from New York: “I would like to be posted on the present political situation in
N.M.: I would like to have data on which to base a dig—not an attack—but
a sly and oblique little dig, at Mr. Hitchcock. Is he still political dictator of
N.M.?” Fall and Rhodes recognized that Hitchcock could be a formidable
foe during the political maneuvering to select the new state’s two U.S. senators; Fall coveted one of these seats. Intense machinations would surround
the selections.25
The news of statehood was just a few days old when Andrews boarded
a train in Washington’s Union Station to return to New Mexico and begin
lobbying for one of the senatorial appointments. The backroom maneuvering
had begun well before he departed. At the state’s constitutional convention,
Fall and Thomas B. Catron, a former congressional delegate and longtime
political kingpin in New Mexico, saw to it that the new constitution autho-
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rized the state’s legislature to appoint New Mexico’s two U.S. senators. The
New Mexico legislature would be among the last state assemblies to elect
U.S. senators prior to ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which
guaranteed their direct election by voters.26
Andrews joined a crowded field of a dozen political aspirants, all political
heavy weights of the late territorial era. Among Republicans were Fall, Catron,
Andrews, and former territorial governor L. Bradford Prince. Democrats joining
the fray included newspaper owner Félix Martínez and attorney A. A. Jones,
both longtime local party leaders from the Las Vegas, New Mexico, area. The
legislature convened in mid-March 1912 and cast eight ballots between 19 and
28 March to winnow the aspirants to two. The sixth ballot is illustrative of the
vote distribution, with the two Democrats—Martínez and Jones—leading a
field of thirteen; Fall was third, Andrews fourth, and Catron in sixth place.27
The legislature’s actions comprise an epilogue to decades of the most
characteristic features of territorial politics: chaotic factionalism and electoral
fraud. The first and last ballots typify the deeply flawed selection process. The
first ballot on Tuesday, 19 March, occurred against a backdrop of monumental
skullduggery, which set the tone for the week ahead. Fall and his supporters,
in collusion with his occasional law partner Elfego Baca, had four Nuevomexicano delegates committed to Andrews arrested on trumped-up charges
that they had been bribed. After several days in jail, forced resignations, and
endless rumors and accusations, a fifteen-member inquiry commission exonerated them and restored them to their seats. Accounts of the deal-making
behind the eighth and final ballot on Thursday, 28 March, remain confusing
and contradictory, but this much is clear: Republican support for Andrews
shifted during a late-night meeting on 27 March, and Republican leaders,
particularly National Republican Committeeman Solomon Luna, forced him
to step aside. Doing so brought substantial gain to Catron and a lesser one to
Fall. Republicans and Democrats who had supported Andrews transferred
their allegiance. Some other Nuevomexicano Democrats likewise aligned
behind Catron and Fall. These late-night shifts in support resulted in the
legislature electing Fall and Catron on 28 March. Thereafter Andrews, New
Mexico’s last territorial delegate, slipped into obscurity, receiving fragmentary
mentions over the next seven years. He moved to Bernalillo County and raised
some cattle, registering his brand on twenty-six steers in 1914. Sometime later,
he moved to southeastern New Mexico hoping to find oil. His search failed,
and he died penniless in Carlsbad in 1919. His remains were shipped to his
native Pennsylvania for burial.28
Andrews, Hitchcock, and Taft are little remembered today for their aid in
securing New Mexico statehood. In fact none are commemorated on a New
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Mexico map. Geographer Robert Julyan has noted, “Place names are the
language in which the nation’s autobiography is written.” Curry and Catron
have counties named for them (in 1909 and 1921, respectively), and the McGaffeys are memorialized in two place names near Gallup. The cartographic
amnesia regarding Hitchcock and Taft is all the more puzzling when their
contributions are stacked against six less successful statehood advocates who
are commemorated in county names: McKinley (1898); Otero (1899); Luna
(1901, for Solomon Luna); and Quay, Roosevelt, and Torrance (1903). The
latter was named for a Pennsylvania financer and key backer of Andrews.29
The citizens of New Mexico sent two congressmen to the House of Representatives: Democrat Harvey B. Fergusson and Republican George Curry.
Each had served the New Mexico Territory in previous official positions,
Fergusson as territorial delegate from 1897 to 1899 and Curry as governor from
August 1907 to March 1910. While Fergusson opposed and Curry supported
the new constitution in January 1911, they maintained amicable relations in
Washington. Prior to joining the recently convened first session of the SixtySecond Congress, both men went immediately from the White House to the
Capitol on 6 January 1912 to present their election certificates to the House
clerk. The enabling bill had granted the new state two representatives, but
when census data gathered in 1910 became available and Congress reapportioned seats in 1911, it allocated New Mexico only one representative.
Late that Saturday afternoon, Fergusson and Curry appeared in the office
of the Speaker of the House, Democratic Representative James Beauchamp
“Champ” Clark of Missouri, one of Fergusson’s longtime friends. With Curry
having outpolled Fergusson by 163 votes, Clark stated: “Well, Harvey, that
puts the shoe on the other foot. We need you here and if you must have a
Republican colleague, I am glad it is Governor Curry, who has made many
friends in the House during his fight for statehood.” Both Fergusson and Curry
joined the House, and congressional reapportionment for New Mexico was
put on hold until the election of 1912.30
Accompanying Curry to the Speaker’s stand for his oath of office on
Monday, 8 January 1912, was Illinois Republican and minority leader James
R. Mann, who had been part of the negotiation to link his co-sponsored railway bill to a vote on statehood two years earlier. The bill’s other co-sponsor,
West Virginia senator Stephen B. Elkins, formerly a New Mexico territorial
delegate in the mid-1870s and long-time associate of Catron, did not live to
see statehood formally arrive. On Sunday, 7 January, the House convened
to hear seven eulogies to Elkins. No one from New Mexico spoke.31
Mutual respect and collegiality prevailed between Fergusson and Curry
even at a time when the Democrats and Republicans in Congress were
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at odds over military spending. In the second session of the Sixty-Second
Congress, Curry introduced the first federal appropriation for an air force.
Fergusson actively and Speaker Clark tacitly supported Curry’s bill. The chair
of the House Committee on Military Affairs opposed the bill, and a similar
measure had been voted down in the previous Congress, but out of respect
for his friend Curry, the chair allowed hearings to proceed. Curry sought a
quarter-million-dollar appropriation, but the House committee approved just
ten percent, or $25,000. A few days later, the House, sitting as a committeeof-the-whole, took up the Army Appropriations Bill, and the Democratic
majority leader allowed Curry to speak briefly in favor of funding the air force.
His advocacy produced an increase to $75,000 on a voice vote. Four years
later, on the eve of America’s entry into World War I and with Representative
Clark still the House Speaker, Congress passed a $600 million appropriation
for the U.S. Army Air Force. In a very real sense, Representative Curry laid
the indispensable groundwork for the Air Force’s presence in New Mexico.
Before he died in Albuquerque in 1947, he witnessed the Army Air Corps
receive vital training and support during World War II at the city’s military
airfield. Representative Fergusson was legislatively active as well. In June
1913, as a member of the House Committee on Public Lands, he voted in
favor of a bill to supply water to San Francisco by building Hetch Hetchy
Dam in Yosemite National Park. Likely sympathetic to California’s water
needs, Fergusson spoke dismissively of opposition efforts, including those
by the Sierra Club. President Wilson signed the bill later that year, but his
signature did not silence the critics.32
Curry bowed out of electoral politics after fourteen months in Congress,
and Fergusson served an additional term before losing a re-election bid in
November 1914. When he left Congress in early March 1915, Fergusson immediately began work as a personal assistant to his long-time friend Sect. of
State William Jennings Bryan. Fergusson’s electoral loss weighed heavily on
him, as did ill health, dwindling finances, and a loveless marriage. On an
early June night in 1915, two days after Bryan had resigned from the cabinet,
Fergusson went into his backyard in Albuquerque and took his own life.33
Federal-State Relations and the Environment
In theory statehood meant the federal government ceded direct political
control over local affairs, but the presence of two U.S. Forest Service officials
in the statehood photographs suggests that agents of the executive branch still
oversaw and protected federal interests in New Mexico. The regulations they
wielded imposed a new kind of regime over New Mexicans and their state.
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From 1900 to 1941, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and its largest agency, the
Forest Service, became the most visible—and powerful—government agency
in New Mexicans’ lives. Since the Spanish colonial period, New Mexico’s
inhabitants had been dependent on access to forests and rangelands for their
livelihood. The photograph taken on the White House steps encapsulated
this relationship, albeit one transformed by modernity, by positioning Amasa
B. McGaffey, a timber entrepreneur, near Forest Service administrators Will
C. Barnes and Arthur C. Ringland.
Born in Vermont in 1870, McGaffey came to New Mexico in the early
1890s. He worked briefly on the railroad before starting his own business as a
salesman of cookware and glasses. His wholesale and retail experiences soon
brought him to the attention of a New York firm that owned a number of
trading posts on the Navajo Reservation. He became the firm’s local manager
in 1901 and traveled over northwest New Mexico and northeast Arizona to
supervise these trading posts. Within several years, he had opened his own
general stores, which were tied to the emerging lumber industry near Thoreau, New Mexico. But he retained an interest in Indian goods, and by 1904
he became president of Benham Trading Company in Albuquerque, which
had a large store in Los Angeles, California. McGaffey, however, was not
content to sit on the fringes of the timber industry as a retail merchant with
a half-dozen camp stores. Soon, he entered directly into the logging business.
In 1905 he delivered 150,000 railroad ties to the Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe Railway (AT&SF), and the next year he supplied them with more than
100,000 ties as well as “a large amount of bridge timber.”34
Timber in New Mexico was a key commodity from 1900 to 1930. Unlike
small-scale, labor-intensive agriculture in New Mexico, commercial logging
was a large-scale corporate endeavor requiring substantial capital investment
in equipment, infrastructure, and manpower. This shift to a capital-intensive
enterprise was evident in the list of lumber-company incorporations and the
summary of stock offerings from 1910. That year nine New Mexico lumber
companies sought to lure investors with stock offerings totaling $10,135,000.
Such sums were necessary to comply with the terms set by the Forest Service
regarding timber sales, which included surety bonds of at least $10,000 and
proof of access to capital to set up a sawmill and build spur rail lines to haul
away cut logs for finishing into wood products.35
For his part, McGaffey made no stock offering in 1910. In the previous
two years, he had secured money from investors in Chicago and California
for his McGaffey Contracting Company and his Santa Barbara Tie and Pole
Company. He built McGaffey’s Contracting Company on a succession of
ever-larger contracts with the AT&SF over nearly three decades. By 1910 he
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was annually supplying AT&SF a million railroad ties, a quantity sufficient for
308 miles of track. Timber from lands ceded to the railroad in western New
Mexico furnished lumber for some of the ties, but the vast majority came from
trees cut in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in northern New Mexico.36
McGaffey tethered his business to the railroad’s needs, prospering handsomely from the relationship. His business formula enabled him simultaneously to ride out the inevitable ups and downs of business cycles and to cope
with the federal government’s ever-growing regulations. Perhaps most decisive
in his good fortune was the nearly insatiable demand for railroad ties. When
McGaffey began his timber business, the railroads had operated for several
decades in the West, and the roadbed and track were in need of replacing,
upgrading, and modernizing. In 1903, after a period of consolidation and
refinancing, the AT&SF route extended from California to Chicago. A dozen
years later, the railroad embarked on another massive construction project
that laid a second set of tracks across Arizona and New Mexico, an expansion
propelled by the competition from freight-hauling ships passing through the
recently completed Panama Canal. Beginning in 1915, railroad lines such as
the AT&SF responded by increasing capacity and reducing freight rates.
The AT&SF provided McGaffey with lucrative contracts and access to its
private land in western New Mexico. But his timber business also depended
on the goodwill of the U.S. Forest Service. During its heyday, logging grew
in tandem with the era of national forests, which coincided with the final
contest over and delivery of New Mexico statehood. The first national forest
reserves were set aside in 1891 to preserve valuable timbered areas for unspecified future use. Six years later, President McKinley signed legislation spelling
out three intentions of the forest reserves: to protect watersheds, preserve
timber, and provide lumber for local use. New Mexico’s first reserve was the
311,040-acre Pecos River Forest Reserve, designated in the General Land Law
Revision Act of 1891. The Gila River and Lincoln Forest reserves followed
in 1899 and 1902, respectively. Under President Roosevelt, a full-blown conservation movement emerged, largely directed by Pinchot. The movement
emphasized making productive and “wise use” of natural resources to reverse
the post–Civil War trend of their wanton destruction by extractive industries
such as logging. In February 1905, the General Land Office of the Department
of the Interior ceded administrative responsibility over forest reserves to the
newly formed Forest Bureau, headed by Pinchot, within the Department of
Agriculture. By the summer of 1908, a renamed U.S. Forest Service oversaw
eight National Forests in New Mexico and three others extending across its
borders into Arizona and Colorado. That summer a newly opened regional
office in Albuquerque administered more than twenty million acres.37
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Although critical to conservation in the United States, the national forest
movement further weakened Nuevomexicano land grant communities. In
1897 the U.S. Supreme Court decision United States v. [Julian] Sandoval
declared communal lands part of the federal public domain. Eventually,
thirty-two million acres were expropriated in New Mexico; among the losses
were several million acres transferred to the Carson National Forest. But the
Supreme Court’s ruling in 1897 culminated rather than initiated the profound
economic and social re-orientation affecting Nuevomexicanos and their
land grants. For twenty years following the arrival of the AT&SF in 1879, the
railroad’s voracious timber cutting significantly reduced forested common
lands, especially on the eastern slopes of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains and
around Las Vegas. Land grant heirs abetted the railroad’s encroachment on
common lands. On the Las Vegas Grant, for example, the locally powerful
brothers Eugenio and Margarito Romero profited handsomely for more than
two decades by cutting and selling timber to the railroad from the grant’s
common lands. Las Gorras Blancas (the White Caps), a vigilante band of
Nuevomexicanos active in the Las Vegas area from 1889 to 1890, opposed
the Romero brothers. They repeatedly destroyed Eugenio Romero’s property
and even tried to murder him in his home while he was sleeping.38
The federal government’s conservation movement required Forest Service officials to monitor and regulate timber cutting in the newly organized
national forests. Some loggers bristled at such oversight and tried to evade
it, but unsuccessfully. McGaffey, however, nurtured a working relationship
with Forest Service officials in New Mexico. By 1909 he had accepted their
supervision of his logging operations, particularly during the dangerous work
of moving log booms down the Rio Grande. Three years later, he participated in the first formal Forest Service land exchange in New Mexico. This
swap transferred acreage in the Zuni Mountains to the Forest Service while
McGaffey secured land for a logging operation near Las Vegas. At the same
time, the Forest Service and the AT&SF negotiated new rules for McGaffey’s
logging practices. The agreement set the terms by which the “cutting of
timber on the railroad sections by the McGaffey Contracting Company
will be done in accordance with the methods and practice of the service.”
A “forest officer,” paid for by the railroad, supervised all logging operations
on its private holdings in the Zuni Mountains to ensure compliance with
federal rules for cruising, reseeding, and slash disposal. The regulations applied to the railroad’s lands were the same standards as those enforced in “a
national forest timber sale.” For its part, the railroad publicly acknowledged
“the advantage of practicing [scientific] forestry on its extensive holdings and
has taken this as an initial step toward carrying out that policy.” Despite these
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good intentions, by the time statehood arrived, widespread and unregulated
cutting had already caused extensive environmental damage in both the Zuni
Mountains and the Sangre de Cristos.39
After statehood and especially in the late 1920s, McGaffey faced increased
economic pressure from three market forces beyond his control: diminished
demand from the railroads, a tightening credit market, and a shrinking pool
of federal lands on which to log in the Southwest. He expected the latter two
pressures to ease when he boarded a commercial flight out of Albuquerque
on 12 September 1929 to meet with financial backers in California. The meeting concerned a timber sale on the Navajo Reservation. But the plane never
arrived. It plowed into Mount Taylor, and McGaffey died in one of the first
commercial aviation crashes in America.40
Seventeen years earlier, Will C. Barnes and McGaffey stood near one
another on the steps of the White House, separated by their wives. The Barnes
family had ended twenty years of cattle ranching just five years before the
photograph was taken. They sold their herd in the late summer of 1906, after
six years of leasing one hundred thousand acres “of the finest grazing land
I [Barnes] had ever seen” situated on the Maxwell Land Grant in northern
New Mexico. That range land differed markedly from the “overgrazing and
abuse” that he had encountered in northern Arizona when his herds had
foraged on the open range. Gradually, Barnes became convinced that existing
unregulated practices undermined and threatened the future of cattle ranching in the West. When he sold his holdings in September 1906, he heeded the
advice of his wife, Edith, and accepted an offer from Chief Forester Pinchot
to become a grazing specialist for the Forest Service in Washington, D.C.
Barnes would retire as the chief of grazing in 1928.41
In 1913 Barnes published a study that amounted to a proto-environmental
critique of livestock grazing on both the open ranges of the arid West and
the public lands in national forests. His extensive descriptions of vegetation,
coupled with practical advice on successful grazing techniques, came from
a deep understanding of the need for what he called “a system of controlled
grazing on the national forest ranges.” Only with such programs, Barnes
posited, could the cattle industry and federal government reverse the damage
from erosion and overgrazing. He optimistically predicted, “There is little
doubt that under proper care the ranges may be restored to their old values.”
Invoking a regenerative theory, he declared, “All that Nature asks is time to
heal up and cover over the scars left by man’s misuse of her bounty.” Barnes
and other managers or scientists of his generation in the U.S. Forest Service
understood the urgency of stopping and reversing the deterioration of arid
rangelands, including those in New Mexico, even if their attempts to do so
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were imperfect. While subsequent federal research addressed the complexity
of ecosystem restoration, the greatest immediate challenge was opposition
among western cattle and sheep interests, or as Barnes put it, “men who had
in the past been practically masters of the range by virtue of their might.”42
The Forest Service decreed regulations that aroused suspicion and outright hostility. Beginning in the late 1890s, the Department of Agriculture
imposed extensive regulations to combat tuberculosis in cattle and scabies
in sheep, and after 1905 the Forest Service enacted further controls as part
of a permit system that regulated grazing on national forests. For example,
livestock owners had to pay a minimal fee of a penny or so annually for each
animal authorized to graze under a permit that extended from one year to ten
years. For the first time, the federal government told New Mexico livestock
owners the location, number, and practices to follow when they grazed their
animals on public lands. The foresters distributed information with forms,
flyers, and signage in Spanish and English. Federal regulations, for example,
prescribed the placement of salt licks; Nuevomexicanos holding permits
received flyers in Spanish admonishing them: “The regulations regarding
salt licks for the animals will be strictly enforced. The failure to provide salt
licks for grazing animals . . . will be considered a breach of contract and will
result in cancellation of the grazing permit.” In reality expulsion rarely occurred; instead, the Forest Service used stern warnings to gain compliance.
These government regulations on public land abruptly shifted the prevailing
balance of power and precipitated threats and violence against forest rangers
for more than two decades. The government, however, did not back down,
and as necessary, rangers met force with force, doling out justice through
arrests and convictions.43
Livestock raisers gradually proved tractable to government regulations
but not before they exacted a major concession. Once their livestock grazed
on federal land, they forced the Forest Service to protect the animals from
predators such as wolves, bears, and mountain lions. Within a few years of
its creation, the Forest Service launched predator-reduction programs, and
in 1911 a young Aldo Leopold accepted this new assignment at the Carson
National Forest. Although he later renounced the hunting and killing of
predatory animals, he willingly and capably participated in their extermination over a number of years. For decades these efforts allied the Forest Service
and, more specifically, the Department of Agriculture’s Predatory and Rodent
Control Branch of the U.S. Biological Survey, with livestock associations in
what became an ecologically disastrous policy.44
Between 1905 and 1920, rangers also helped homesteaders. The Forest
Service’s grazing permits favored them over corporations, a policy that ran
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counter to its treatment of timber interests. Barnes explained that permits
for homesteaders were “generally based on the number of stock which the
average settler can care for in connection with his homestead and support
himself and family in a modest way.” This preference for “the little fellows”
over “the larger men” resulted in “the little fellows coming to the front” in
numbers of permits received throughout the national forests. In 1912 New
Mexicans held grazing permits for about 95,000 cattle and 650,000 sheep.45
Barnes and Arthur C. Ringland shared a commitment to aid “the little
fellows.” In particular, Ringland tried to help Nuevomexicanos following
the loss of their traditional rights in the wake of the ruling in United States
v. [Julian] Sandoval (1897), which transferred common lands to the federal
government. Born in Brooklyn, New York, but raised in nearby Montclair,
New Jersey, Ringland worked in Washington, D.C. for two years in the government’s Forest Bureau prior to entering Yale University and earning his
undergraduate degree in forestry in late spring 1905. He spent the next year
in Capitan, New Mexico, working as an assistant in the Lincoln National
Forest, and then two years, mostly in Washington state, administering the
Forest Homestead Act. In December 1908, Pinchot elevated Ringland to
district forester in New Mexico because of his skillful implementation of the
forest homestead legislation. He had a long, distinguished federal career in
many capacities and lived into his early nineties.46
On 11 June 1906, U.S. senators and other elected officials throughout the
West forced Roosevelt to sign the Forest Homestead Act to aid land owners
displaced by the creation of national forests. Through homestead claims, the
law restored to individuals arable public lands along with grazing and privateuse timber rights in national forests. Moreover, priority for claims went to
anyone who had recently or currently occupied lands within a national forest
and used them for agricultural purposes. This provision acquiesced to de
facto squatting but also enabled Nuevomexicanos to make homestead claims
on the common lands they had used prior to federal takeover. The Forest
Service surveyed and determined the suitability of lands for homesteading,
and the Department of Interior’s General Land Office handled the requisite
paperwork.47
The program began modestly. In late 1910, the Carson National Forest
listed as open for homesteading a total of 1,598 acres available in four areas
of the forest. The Pecos National Forest similarly returned thousands of acres
to residents of the former San Miguel del Vado Grant near Las Vegas. Soon,
thousands of entries on homesteads were filed for lands in national forests
throughout New Mexico, and for the fifteen months between March 1913
and June 1914, a total of 200,528 acres in national forests in New Mexico were

winter 2012

holtby N 27

“restored as homesteads entries.” Implementation of the Forest Homestead
Act in concert with the preference for small-scale farmers and livestock grazers permitted some Nuevomexicanos to eke out a living for several decades
after the loss of communal holdings. But Barnes and Ringland administered
an emerging federal conservation effort that confronted more problems and
constraints than they had the knowledge or ability to solve. Despite these limitations, the two Forest Service officials carried out policies that buffered some
Nuevomexicanos from the adverse effects of losing their communal lands.48
In a larger sense, their efforts epitomized the transfer of power that is
the leitmotif in the two photographs taken on 6 January 1912. Direct federal
control yielded to regulatory oversight, and state and federal officials along
with citizens collectively shared responsibility for managing New Mexico’s
affairs. It is fitting that the statehood photographs were taken in January, a
month named for the Roman god Janus, who faced both past and future.
Similarly, statehood demarked what had ended from what was beginning,
but its story continues.
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